Two-dimensional Logic and Two-dimensionalism in Philosophy (Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language 2012)
Survey article, containing a new normal form theorem for 2D logic with full complement of connectives.
Draft Published Version (Routledge)
Survey article, containing a new normal form theorem for 2D logic with full complement of connectives.
Draft Published Version (Routledge)
(with Paul Portner) Tense and Time Handbook of Philosophical Logic 2002)
Extensive survey for handbook.
Draft Published Version (Oxford Journals)
Extensive survey for handbook.
Draft Published Version (Oxford Journals)
Embedded Definite Descriptions: Russelian Analysis and Semantic Puzzles (Mind 2000).
A sentence containing a number of definite descriptions, each lying within the scope of its predecessor, is naturally read as asserting the uniqueness of a sequence of objects satisfying the descriptions. The project of providing a general uniform procedure for eliminating embedded definite descriptions that gets this and other logical forms right is impeded by several puzzles.
Draft Published Version (Oxford Journals)
A sentence containing a number of definite descriptions, each lying within the scope of its predecessor, is naturally read as asserting the uniqueness of a sequence of objects satisfying the descriptions. The project of providing a general uniform procedure for eliminating embedded definite descriptions that gets this and other logical forms right is impeded by several puzzles.
Draft Published Version (Oxford Journals)
The Pragmatics of Tense (Synthese 1979).
We describe a Montague-like framework within which the tenses of English might be interpreted and construct a fragment of English within this framework to do just that. "Pragmatics" here indicates that we are interested in how reference (and truth) depends on context.
Draft Published Version (Springer)
We describe a Montague-like framework within which the tenses of English might be interpreted and construct a fragment of English within this framework to do just that. "Pragmatics" here indicates that we are interested in how reference (and truth) depends on context.
Draft Published Version (Springer)
Stenius on Meaning (Theoria 1984)
Stenius has defended an account according to which the meaning of a sentence is given by a "radical," presenting a state of affairs and a "mood" indicating the role this presentation plays in the language game. This paper poses some questions that such an account must answer and compares Stenius's with others that have been given.
Draft Published Version
Stenius has defended an account according to which the meaning of a sentence is given by a "radical," presenting a state of affairs and a "mood" indicating the role this presentation plays in the language game. This paper poses some questions that such an account must answer and compares Stenius's with others that have been given.
Draft Published Version
(with A.K. Joshi) Centered Logic: The Role of Entity-Centered Sentence Representation in Natural Language Inferencing" (in IJCAI Proceedings 1979)
A salient difference between sentences of natural language and formulas of predicate logic is that in the former a term is “centered,” usually, but not always, by being put in subject position. Such a sentence may be viewed as attributing a property to the object denoted by its center. Other terms may be viewed as “masked” within the predicate. We begin investigation of a formal logical system sharing this feature, with the idea of illuminating not just whether an inference is valid, but how difficult it is. Difficulty is raised when a centered and masked terms change roles (change of topic) and when a temporary assumption with a new center is introduced. Questions about the scope of limited-difficulty fragments of the system remain open.
Draft IJCAI Russian translation
A salient difference between sentences of natural language and formulas of predicate logic is that in the former a term is “centered,” usually, but not always, by being put in subject position. Such a sentence may be viewed as attributing a property to the object denoted by its center. Other terms may be viewed as “masked” within the predicate. We begin investigation of a formal logical system sharing this feature, with the idea of illuminating not just whether an inference is valid, but how difficult it is. Difficulty is raised when a centered and masked terms change roles (change of topic) and when a temporary assumption with a new center is introduced. Questions about the scope of limited-difficulty fragments of the system remain open.
Draft IJCAI Russian translation